"The President…shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur…" "The Congress shall have power to provide for the common defense…to regulate commerce with foreign nations…to declare war…" "The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States…"
The Constitution of the United States
The framers of our constitution intentionally gave powers to each branch of government so that no single branch could establish autocracy over the others. This separation of powers provided a system of "checks and balances" that guaranteed "power parity." One of the most insightful commentaries on the separation of powers was offered by Justice Brandeis in the 1926 Myers case in which he said:
"The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency, but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction but, by means of the inevitable friction incident in the distribution of the governmental powers among the three Departments, to save the people from autocracy."
During the constitutional convention of 1787, the framers agreed that:
"…an Executive needed to be strong enough to supply "energy" to the government, and to act as some kind of check on the legislature. At the same time, we needed an executive whose powers were sufficiently limited so that he could not turn himself into a tyrant." 2 
Further, as noted in Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Lois, "…Miserable indeed would be the case, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging crimes or differences of individuals." 3
Congress is given the power to declare war; the President and the Senate are given the power to make peace by treaty. But on the subject of neutrality the Constitution is silent.
It is also silent on the subject of abrogating treaties, as it is in recognition of new governments and on the establishment of international agreements short of treaties.
These overlaps and gaps compel the Executive and Legislative to collaborate and consult with each other. What has been the result?
CONSULTATION; AN "INAUSPICIOUS" BEGINNING
Early in his first term, President George Washington visited the Senate chamber (a surprise to the senators) with his Secretary of War. He bluntly stated that he called on the Senate for their advice and consent to some propositions in the treaty that the government had negotiated with the Southern Indians. The propositions were listed on paper and briefly presented. Senator Morris moved that the paper be referred to a committee of five, which would report as soon thereafter as possible. The President rose and said, "This defeats every purpose of my coming here!" After a brief period of silent waiting, the President left enraged. Upon exiting the Senate chamber he stated, "I'll be damned if I ever come here again!" 4 To the Senators, the President's actions amounted to "treading on their necks." In their view, review of the treaty propositions in committee -without the presence of the President -was necessary to offer an impartial consideration of the proposals. As this anecdote suggests, consultation by the Executive with the Legislative had a "rocky" start.
Not surprisingly, we have not made much improvement since then.
CONGRESSIONAL OR PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT; DIFFERENT TIMES, DIFFERENT STYLES
From George Washington to Bill Clinton, every president has struggled to establish the Executive's primacy over the Legislative branch in order to form and conduct foreign policy. Indeed, our founders' fear of autocracy heavily influenced the very foundation of our government.
After declaring independence, the Congress conducted war, governed, and eventually approved the Articles of Confederation, all without a chief executive. By 1787, however, the Confederation was in crisis, particularly in foreign affairs. Congress had the power to make treaties, but did not have the power to make state legislatures honor them.
Likewise, Congress authorized foreign trade but could not regulate it. It was the desire to end such political immobility and to create a more efficient government that resulted in the Constitutional Convention.
During the first 40 years of the Federal government, Congress delegated and otherwise "allowed" broad powers to the President and the precedent of "Presidential government" was set. Washington, Adams, and Jefferson all withheld treaty information, consulted with Congress sporadically, and used military force without the consent of Congress.
The refusal to provide information on the Jay Treaty, Washington's Whiskey Rebellion, Adam's "quasi-war" with France, and Jefferson's "defensive" actions on the Barbary States all serve as examples. 5 James Madison's administration brought "Congressional government" back to the fore. He believed that "the right to determine the foreign policy of the United States devolves on Congress by virtue of its power to declare war, and that the powers of the President in the diplomatic sphere are instrumental only, or involve at most no greater range of discretion than the determination of matters of fact." 6 The strength of Lincoln and circumstances of the Civil War led to an ExecutiveLegislative relationship dominated by the President. But, after the war and Lincoln's death, the "Congressional government" once again predominated and featured a particularly powerful Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Sumner.
Woodrow Wilson influenced a return to "Presidential government." He argued that Congress was neither predictable nor accountable, that power was diffused, and that governing by committee was ineffective in dealing with foreign affairs. A lack of consultation and Wilson's miscalculation of the Senate led to the US rejection of the League of Nations, and marked the turn toward "Congressional government" once again. What does this all mean? In short, it means that the constitution's separation of powers provides the capacity for different branches of government to assert their prerogatives in the conduct of foreign affairs. Change is fundamental to this system. We have frequent elections and appointments which put people into constantly changing relationships with others. With each change, legislators, diplomats, and presidents pursue their perceived obligations and interests. In this dynamic, we should expect friction, but we should work toward cooperation. As we have seen, some administrations are very successful in conducting foreign affairs, and the Congress assumes -by choice -a lesser role. In other administrations, the Congress takes a more assertive role, but U.S. foreign affairs remains effective. What is important is not who asserts themselves, but rather the 
HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA; TEST CASE GONE "BAD"
In 1991, a popular uprising drove Somalia's President Siad Barre into exile. Rival clans struggled with each other to fill the resulting power vacuum. With no clan able to emerge victorious, the fractious society fell into anarchy. The economy collapsed. Food distribution essentially ended and several hundred thousand Somalis starved to death.
The catastrophe came to the attention of the broader international community and inspired UN action. With Admiral Jonathon Howe directing UNOSOM II, a total disarmament policy was put into effect. It soon led to a return of violence and instability which threatened the mission.
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From humanitarian relief to "man hunt" Almost immediately, the media began to report the ineptness of UNISOM II. In Somalia, four journalists were killed on 14 July 1993, and four U.S. soldiers were killed there on 8 August. In an attempt to "bag" Aideed on 30 August, U.S. Rangers instead captured UN aid officials. 13 Many of the capture attempts resulted in loss of innocent Lake to answer Congress' concerns about U.S. foreign policy. The result was disastrous.
Christopher, Aspin, and Lake were besieged by skeptical lawmakers who scorched them with demands for a clear road map for an exit from Somalia, and scolded them for their inability to articulate U.S. policy and goals. 22 But this was not an easy decision for President Clinton to make. There were important considerations that suggested the U.S.
should continue its support of the UN mission.
Statecraft and foreign policy; pressure to "stay the course"
After the Cold War, President Bush envisioned a world where disagreement between Nation-States could be accomplished through international organizations, and conflict could be resolved through the collective effort of coalitions. Indeed, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the UN became a cooperative organization of action instead of a forum of confrontation between the Soviets and Americans. Somalia, in many respects was a test case for the UN, and the commitment of U.S. forces there would set a precedent for the "New World order." Bush was fully committed, and initiated U.S.
action to support the UN in Somalia. When Bill Clinton won the presidential election, he "stayed the course." Criticized for his lack of foreign policy experience during the campaign, there was considerable incentive for President Clinton to make U.S. October that Executive-led consultation with Congress resumed.
THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY; ANOTHER LESSON IN CONSULTATION
On October 13, 1999, the U.S. Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by a vote of 51-48. This marked the first time that a security-related treaty had been defeated since the Treaty of Versailles nearly 80 years ago. President Clinton joined leaders from around the world in condemning the Senate's action. The first world leader to sign the Treaty in 1996, the President declared that the CTBT was one of his administration's highest priorities, and that he was "prepared to lead the world in a sustained effort to achieve the test ban." 30 Most foreign policy experts agree with an editorial in The Economist that the defeat of the treaty was a "humiliation for the Clinton administration, a pyrrhic victory for the Senate, and a disaster for America's foreign- 32 Under the terms of the agreement, the Republicans and Democrats were limited to one amendment to the resolution of the ratification, which had the effect of curtailing the administration's ability to craft a resolution that would address concerns voiced by some of the senators.
Before discussing the issues central to the debate, it is important to understand how the administration reasoned that the CTBT would enhance our national security. First, it believed that the treaty would allow the U.S. to maintain a safe and reliable deterrent.
Second, the administration felt that the treaty would constrain "vertical proliferation," defined as the development of more advanced nuclear weapons by declared nuclearweapon states. Third, the treaty would constrain "horizontal proliferation," or the spread of nuclear weapons to states not currently in possession of nuclear weapons. Fourth, the CTBT would strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and thus serve as the quid pro quo to entice nations to agree to an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.
Fifth, the CTBT would improve the ability of the U.S. to detect and deter nuclear explosive testing. Sixth, U.S. ratification would encourage other countries to ratify.
Finally, the CTBT would establish an international "norm" against testing which would constrain non-signatory nations from testing nuclear weapons. 33 During the hearings, the opponents voiced two main concerns. The first was whether or not the U.S. could effectively verify that countries were adhering to the CTBT. The second was whether or not the U.S. could maintain a safe and reliable nuclear arsenal the Secretaries of Defense and Energy could no longer certify that a weapon critical to the U.S. nuclear deterrent was safe and reliable. With respect to verification, the witnesses argued that even though some low-yield nuclear tests might go undetected, such tests are not militarily significant. 34 These views were challenged by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger who argued that, in the absence of underground nuclear testing, confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal would inevitably decline. 35 This view was supported by Henry Kissinger, who noted that the computers envisioned to complete the nuclear simulations -as part of the SSMP -would not be available for almost another decade and that the directors of the weapons laboratories, charged with the duty to administer these tests, were highly ambivalent in their testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 36 On verification, the U.S. is currently unable to detect explosions below a few tons of yield. Furthermore, signatory countries to the CTBT can declare 50-square kilometer areas "off limits" to inspectors. These conditions fell short of convincing some senators that CTBT is verifiable.
Regarding enforcement and proliferation, some senators joined Senator Roberts, who argued that the CTBT would not stop or slow down the development of nuclear weapons if a nation deemed these weapons to be vital to their national interests. 37 In the case of the CTBT, the Clinton administration intentionally negotiated the treaty without congressional participation or consultation, even though a precedent of appointing legislators as members of negotiating teams to create bipartisan "partnership"
in the conduct of foreign policy had been set by previous presidents ever since WW II.
For example, the Carter administration invited 26 senators (14 Republicans and 12 Democrats), including supporters and critics, to "sit in on the SALT II arms negotiations in Geneva." The Reagan administration accepted a formal Senate Arms Control
Observer Group that became a prominent feature of treaty making. This group fell into disuse early in the Clinton administration.
One might point out that although the Constitution compels the Executive to consult the Legislative, the reverse is also true. Yes, but when one considers the consequences of failed U.S. foreign policy, the Executive clearly suffers the humiliation of credibility loss.
It is the Executive, despite the separation of powers, whom global leaders look to for leadership and cooperation. It is the Executive, then, who needs to ensure that sufficient consultation is done to get the advice and consent of the Congress. If not, "fait accompli"
or miscalculation is the result. If it is miscalculation, the Executive's credibility suffers, and so too does our foreign policy.
In the end, I think our founding fathers would be pleased to see the Congress use its constitutional power to remind the administration of its obligation to seek advice and consent, despite the humiliation of damaged foreign policy. And maybe it is a good example, not only to Americans, but also to the world, that our system of governmentour separation of powers -works.
